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In April 2009, the Ontario Social Benefits Tribunal ended a 10-year battle for Appellants 
Norman Werbeski and Robert Tranchemontagne in its deliberation that the Ontario 
Disability Support Program Act violated their rights as enshrined in the Ontario Human 
Rights Code when it failed to recognize their alcoholism as a disability. Drawing specific 
excerpts from the Respondent‟s (Ontario government) defence and the Social Benefit 
Tribunal‟s decision, this essay looks at how government policy affects persons with 
substance addiction and argues that subsection 5(2) of the Ontario Disability Support 
Program Act places burdens on substance abusers and contributes significantly to their 
social stigma. The outcomes of excluding substance addiction from the United States 
Social Assistance Programmes are reviewed and referred to in analyzing the Ontario 
government‟s claims. The conclusion highlights how this case reflects key steps toward 
greater inclusion for persons with disabilities and in particular for those whose disability 
is addiction and alcoholism.  
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Abstrait 
En avril 2009, après dix ans, le Tribunal ontarien de l‟aide social a mis fin au cas 
juridique des Appelants Norman Werbeski et Robert Tranchemontagne. Le Tribunal 
abordait la question de si la Loi de 1997 sur le Programme ontarien de soutien aux 
personnes handicapées a violé les droits de ces deux hommes, protégés dans le Code 
ontarien des droits de la personne, quand il n‟a pas reconnu leur alcoolisme en tant 
qu‟handicap. En utilisant des citations spécifiques de l‟Intimé (le gouvernement 
ontarien) et la décision du Tribunal de l‟aide social, ce discours aborde la question de 
comment la politique gouvernementale s‟impose sur les personnes ayant une addiction 
(telle que l‟alcool ou la drogue); constate que la Section 5(2) du Programme ontarien de 
soutien aux personnes handicapées impose des fardeaux sur les alcooliques et 
toxicomanes; et comment ladite section contribue au stigmate social envers eux. Les 
résultats sociaux de l‟exclusion des alcooliques et toxicomanes des Programmes 
américains de soutien social seront vus et abordés afin d‟analyser les revendications du 
gouvernement ontarien. La conclusion de ce discours souligne comment ce cas-ci est le 
résultant de certains étapes clés dans la lutte pour l‟inclusion des personnes 




Mots clés : Tribunal de l’aide social, Loi de 1997 sur le Programme ontarien de soutien 
aux personnes handicapées, alcoolisme, handicap, stigmate 
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  When disability and law converge, we are often left with unanswered questions 
and contested debates that illuminate how far the quest for a fully inclusive society has 
truly come. Legal cases that bring into focus the complexities of disability challenge 
society‟s concepts not only of what is normal, but also of what qualifies as an 
“acceptable” disability. As well, the frequent involvement of discrimination and human 
rights in these cases demands a reconsideration of the common notions that society 
holds of acceptability. These considerations are necessary if groups who exist at 
society‟s margins are to be integrated fully. It is a challenge that, at best, propels us 
toward deeper understanding and greater tolerance acknowledging that, as the United 
Nations Declaration of Human Rights proclaims in Article 1, all persons are born free 
and equal in dignity and rights (United Nations, 1948). 
 There is potential for greater inclusivity within society, and one way that such 
potential is realized is through legislation that guides and informs. However, on the 
opposite side of the same coin there exists the commonly held belief that inclusion of all 
can be an idealistic notion that risks compromising the freedom and dignity that 
democratic states strive to uphold. This holds particularly true when our opinions of 
those who exist on society‟s margins are based on the belief that their plight is a result 
of supposed self-inflicted handicaps or moral failings.  
 An example of a marginalized group that continues to challenge society‟s moral 
concepts and tolerance are those who are addicted to substances, such as alcohol and 
drugs. The tendency to perceive alcoholism and drug addiction both as a weakened 
state and the failure of the individual to stay within the moral guidelines that society 
creates indirectly but significantly influences the design of welfare legislation and social 
benefit programmes. It is with the same guidelines that we frequently judge and 
condemn substance abusers and therefore justify exclusionary legislation.  
 One natural progression that results from viewing addiction as a moral fault is to 
punish the addict. This is carried out in vigilant program policies whose guidelines limit 
social assistance only to those who are deemed as deserving and who would genuinely 
benefit (Jones & Basser-Marks, 1999). The outcome of laws demarcating who deserves 
and who does not cannot only hinder the progress of inclusiveness, but also impede 
society‟s understanding of vulnerable groups, disability, and the concept of equality.  
 In April 2009, the Social Benefits Tribunal of Ontario ruled in favour of Appellants 
Norman Werbeski and Robert Tranchemontagne. By stating that subsection 5(2) of the 
Ontario Disabilities Support Program Act (ODSPA) contravened Section 1 of the Ontario 
Human Rights Code (OHRC) [Social Benefits Tribunal, Tribunal File No. 9910-07541 R, 
0005-04579] the Tribunal determined subsection (5)2 of the ODSPA specifically 
precluded persons whose disability is substance addiction. It therefore violated their 
rights to equal treatment as set by the OHRC. Subsection 5(2) of the ODSPA states that 
a person is not eligible for income support if 
 
(a) The person is dependent on or addicted to alcohol, a drug or some other 
chemically active substance; 
(b) The alcohol, drug or other substance has not been authorized by prescription 
as provided for in the regulations; and 
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(c) The only substantial restriction in activities of daily living is attributable to the 
use or cessation of use of the alcohol, drug or other substance at the time of 
determining or reviewing eligibility. 
Section 1 of the OHRC, however, proclaims that 
 
Every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to services, goods and 
facilities, without discrimination because of race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, 
ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, age, marital status, family 
status or disability. (Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c.H.19, s.1; 1999. 
C.6, s.28 2001, c.32, s.27 (1); 2005, c.5, s.32 (1)) 
 
  The Social Benefits Tribunal decision is a milestone for disadvantaged persons 
across the country. At least within Ontario, this decision challenges definitions of 
disability long embedded into social policy that clearly dictate who and who is not 
entitled to social benefits. Such decisions exemplify the government‟s growing 
recognition that there are significant limitations toward an inclusive society when 
policies guiding social benefits are designed to preclude those who need them most. 
However, it is a murkier determination as to whether that same acknowledgment has, or 
ever will, permeate society at large and affect deeply rooted social stigmas associated 
with substance addicts.  
 With this in mind, there are important lessons to be learned from the Social 
Benefit Tribunal‟s decision-making process in its final verdict. By understanding the 
premise of the arguments put forth by both the Appellants (Werbeski and 
Tranchemontagne) and the Respondent (Ontario government), and the Tribunal‟s 
consideration of both, it is the goal of this paper to elucidate not only on how the 
Tribunal reached its decision, but why such a decision is justified. 
  Each section of this paper draws on excerpts of the case. The first section looks 
at how government policy approaches persons with substance addiction. This section 
considers how exclusionary criteria within social policy deepen the stigma associated 
with addiction as well as the stigma that is deflected onto the communities in which 
addicts congregate, both of which further skew the existing negative perception of the 
addict. Section II will consider the Tribunal‟s determination that substance addiction in 
general and alcoholism in particular is a disability. This section explores some of the 
reasons why society resists accepting addiction as a disability, which is the issue at the 
core of the debate within the Tranchemontagne case. 
 Section III expands upon the disadvantages and burdens that subsection 5(2) of 
the ODSPA places upon substance abusers. To examine the question of whether 
stigma acts as a deterrent to addiction, thereby justifying the exclusion of addicts from 
social assistance programs, this section will briefly look at some of the outcomes of the 
specific exclusion of substance addiction in the United States Supplemental Security 
Income Act and the Social Security Disability Insurance Act. 
 In the concluding section, this paper comments on several ways that the 
Tribunal‟s decision and the very existence and process of this case within the Ontario 
court system reflects key steps toward greater inclusion for persons with disabilities and 
in particular for those whose disability is addiction and alcoholism. The Tribunal‟s verdict 
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exemplifies a very robust interpretation of disability and such outcomes encourage a 
reconsideration, or at the very least, a challenge to existing ways of interpreting 
disability. This is key to broadening society‟s understanding of the link between the 
greater inclusion of marginalized groups within social programs and the equality rights 
that are guaranteed to all (Rioux & Valentine, 2006). 
 Outcomes can be shaped by definitions, and the results are good indicators of 
whether or not the definition in question works. Much like the analogy of throwing a 
stone into a pond, the rippling effect of how disabilities are, and for that matter, are not 
defined and whether or not such definitions include substance addiction can have 
tremendous impact on the lives of many regardless of their direct, indirect, or non-
existent relationship with alcoholism and/or drug addiction. Without a doubt, there will 
always be tensions surrounding the issue of whether alcoholics and substance addicts 
are deserving of social benefits. However, as the decision of the Social Benefit Tribunal 
demonstrates, if we are to move toward inclusivity, we must move away from dwelling 
on how disabilities are created and instead focus on outcomes that facilitate long-term 




The Respondent also argued that the intent and effect of subsection 5(2) is to 
enhance the dignity of the Appellants and those like them; that it is benevolent in 
nature in that the receipt of less financial assistance through OW is beneficial for 
those whose disability is substance dependence and that because there exists a 
strong possibility of total recovery from their disability, OW income assistance is a 
better fit. The Tribunal does not accept this argument. (Social Benefits Tribunal, p. 
17) 
 In May and October of 1999 respectively, Norman Werbeski and Robert 
Tranchemontagne applied for income support under the ODSPA. Both Appellants 
argued that the debilitating and long-term effects of their known and chronic alcoholism 
was a disability, preventing them from sustaining any type of employment 
(Tranchemontagne v. Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program), [2006] 1 
S.C.R.513, 2006 SCC 14) and therefore, qualified both men for benefit payments under 
the ODSPA. The Tribunal‟s initial ruling was that both Werbeski and Tranchemontagne 
qualified for support payments under the Ontario Works benefits program (OW), but not 
under the ODSPA because of subsection 5 (2). The Appellants response was that this 
same section of the legislation contravened their rights as formed by Section 1 of the 
OHRC. The case was moved up to the Supreme Court of Canada, which ordered the 
Social Benefit Tribunal to reconsider their position. Upon this mandated review, it was 
found that both men had been discriminated against by the provincial government in the 
form of entitled support payments due to their disability. As such, the provincial 
government was ordered by the Tribunal to initiate payments to both men under the 
ODSPA. 
 Financially, the incentives for pursuing payments under the ODSPA instead of 
the OWA are clear. The maximum monthly payment provided by OW at the time of the 
trial was $536 compared with a maximum monthly payment of $959 provided by the 
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Ontario Disability Support Program (ODSP) (Erickson & Callaghan, 2005). The 
distinction between the payments is found in the purpose of both policies. However, it is 
the defence argument of the Ontario government that exemplifies why they hold that 
excluding substance addicts is justified.  
 The purpose of the OWA reads as follows: The OWA 
 
(a) recognizes individual responsibility and promotes self reliance through 
employment 
(b) provides temporary financial assistance to those most in need while they satisfy 
obligations to become and stay employed; 
(c) effectively serves people needing assistance  
    (Ontario Works Act, S.O. 1997, Section 1, emphasis added). 
    
Assuming a more long-term involvement, the ODSPA states its purpose is to establish a 
program that 
 
(a) provides income and employment supports to eligible persons with disabilities;  
(b) recognizes that government, communities, families and individuals share 
responsibility for providing such supports;  
(c) effectively serves persons with disabilities who need assistance; and  
(d) is accountable to the taxpayers of Ontario.  
    (Ontario Disability Support Program Act, S.O. 1997, Section 
1). 
 
As with most social assistance policies, there are qualification requirements that must 
be met in order to access financial benefits (Jones & Basser-Marks, 1999). While 
accessibility or lack thereof is determined by the policy‟s eligibility criteria, the ODSPA 
also defines what is considered by the Ontario government to be an acceptable 
disability. On a much more subtle, but equally important level, if addicts qualified under 
the OWA and were ineligible under the ODSPA, the Government‟s approach toward 
substance dependency would be primarily promoting “self reliance through 
employment” (OWA, S.O. 1997. Section 1[a]). The failure to recognize substance 
addiction as a disability through a determination of where it fits in social policy programs 
neglects the findings of a 2004 World Health Organization report that states that 
substance dependency is, in fact, “a medical disorder that could affect any human 
being” (World Health Organization, 2004, p. 248). As a result, both the purpose and 
criteria of social policy, and in particular that of the ODSPA, contribute significantly to 
the addiction stigma and serves to reinforce the extent to which society continues to 
negatively perceive addicts.  
 While the distinction of subsection 5(2) of the ODSPA demonstrates how 
exclusionary clauses contribute to the definition of disability, the specific exclusion of 
substance addiction from the ODSPA demonstrates the significant weight that 
legislation places on how disabilities are created. As Erickson and Callaghan (2005) 
point out, the ODSPA rationalizes its exclusion criteria on the “motivation-to-change” 
construct (p.100), which is a cornerstone in the Respondent‟s arguments. This 
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argument, combined with the Tribunal‟s initial response of qualifying the Appellants 
under the OWA, but not the ODSPA, indicates a preliminary conclusion that alcoholism 
is a temporary state that is best dealt with through provision of “temporary financial 
assistance” (OWA, 1997, Sect. 1, subsection b). Add to this the Respondent‟s additional 
claim that alcoholism is a short-term disability that justifies the expectation of a full 
recovery and therefore, a return to work (Social Benefits Tribunal, p. 19), and an even 
clearer picture emerges of how government‟s treatment of substance addiction and its 
rationale for doing so not only contributes to the stigma, but fertilizes the moral terrain 
upon which addicts are frequently judged. In addition to this, the medical profession‟s 
description of addiction as the effect of the “spirit of infirmity” and “learned helplessness” 
and its endorsement of the motivation-to-change approach purports that additional 
funds channelled to substance addicts will result in greater addiction (Social Benefits 
Tribunal, p.19). This suggests that addicts are quite capable of overcoming their 
addictions, but make a rational choice not to do so. This implication adds to the 
perception that if the addict is not clearly controlled by policy guidelines, he or she will 
take perpetual advantage of the entitlement programs that are put into place.  
 Room (2005) states that although alcoholism and drug addiction are categorized 
under an international classification of health disorders, in social terms “alcoholism and 
drug addiction are thoroughly moralized and derogated categories” (p.146). Citing a 
study released by the World Health Organization that places drug addiction and 
alcoholism at or near the top of conditions that garner social disapproval in Canada 
(WHO, 2004), the Tribunal‟s findings parallel Room‟s by acknowledging the “pre-
existing stigma related to addictions” (Social Benefits Tribunal, p. 14). Stemming from 
this acknowledgment is a key component of the final decision in Tranchemontagne 
case. Although the Respondent‟s comments reflect a very real and common opinion of 
persons with substance addictions, it is disconcerting that the same opinion is reflected 
in subsection 5(2) of the ODSPA, adding to the stigma that is associated with them.
 The use of exclusionary criteria by the ODSPA “forces persons with addictions to 
accept personal responsibility for their illness” (Sowers, 1998, p. 334) and deflects 
responsibility away from the government. By individualizing the burden of addiction, the 
government fails to consider how the stigma is not limited to addicts, but also extends to 
the communities in which they tend to co-habitat (Erickson & Callaghan, 2005). Stigma 
by association (Goffman, 2006) is a result of the ripple effect of addiction on the 
community, adding significant social and economic concerns to the issue. It can be 
argued that if substance addiction is continued to be regarded as a problem of the 
individual, then the ongoing government approach will be to “fix” that individual either 
through treatment, or in this context, by denying them greater income benefits and 
proper recognition as people with disabilities. The result is not only a failure to recognize 
and uphold equality rights for persons with addictions, but within the socio-economic 
realm, there is little attention paid to the importance of “building the economic resources 
and social capital of communities” (Erickson & Callaghan, 2005, p. 103). If the ODSP, 
as one of the two primary social benefit programs in Ontario omitted, or at the very least 
restructured, subsection 5(2) of the ODSPA, there is a potential to promote inclusivity 
through legislation. Such strategies might result in a better approach for communities 
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that are stigmatized by association, which in turn can provide the framework to provide 




The Respondent argued that the Appellants and those who are denied income 
support by subsection 5(2) are better served by OW. The Respondent also 
maintained that because of the nature of their disability, the Appellants can be 
expected to recover and return to work. Their disability being of a short term 
nature, the Appellants are better served by the OW regime rather than the ODSP 
regime which is designed to provide for persons with long term disabilities (Social 
Benefits Tribunal, p.19). 
 
 Rioux and Valentine (2006) state that “arguments by governments grounded in 
economic rationalism or in biomedical views of disablement have led them to justify their 
„discretion‟ over policy and spending at the expense of the exercise of rights for people 
with disabilities” (p.115). The Respondent‟s argument is shaped to a great degree by 
the perception that alcoholism and consequently, other substance addictions, is an 
individual pathology. As an individual pathology, the costs associated with substance 
dependency are considered “an anomaly and social burden” (Rioux & Valentine, 2006, 
p.117), and this would suggest that there is an underlying motive to excluding 
substance addicts from the ODSP and from receiving its higher monthly payments. By 
classifying substance addiction as an individual pathology, the argument presented by 
the Respondent is that the best approach to substance dependency is its elimination, 
which is achieved by limiting the access substance addicts have to social benefits as 
outlined by the exclusionary clause of subsection 5(2) of the ODSPA. By hanging its hat 
on the individual pathology theory, the Ontario government justifies subsection 5(2) as 
well as its use of a cost-benefit analysis. Additionally, the qualification of substance 
addictions as individual pathologies that is reinforced by government social assistance 
programs compromises the concept of inclusivity and the realization of equality in two 
significant ways. Firstly, it creates gaps between disabled and non-disabled groups and 
secondly, it widens the distance between substance addicts and people with other types 
of disabilities.  
 
Creating Gaps between Disabled and Non-Disabled Groups 
 Disability as an individual pathology theory has long been viewed as narrowly 
conceived and extremely limited (Rioux & Valentine, 2006). One of the goals of the 
disability community has been to educate society with the intent of replacing the 
misperception of disability as an individual pathology with the now commonly accepted 
and more robust theory that recognizes it as a social construct impacted by the overlap 
of physical environments, service provisions, and the way in which society is organized 
(Rioux & Valentine, 2006). Yet, while the social construction theory is accepted and 
lauded primarily as it pertains to both physical and intellectual disability, there seems to 
be resistance in extending and applying it to substance addiction. 
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 Drawing on a classification scheme developed by Schneider and Ingram (1993), 
Brucker (2009) discusses the challenges concerning whether disability benefits ought to 
be provided for persons with substance addictions. The scheme defines four categories 
of target groups whose relationship with public policy and its payments is influenced by 
the social construction of and the current political power (or lack thereof) associated 
with their situation (Brucker, 2009). Her identification of each group is informed by 
whether the group‟s social construction is positive or negative and how this 
determination connects to its political strength or weakness. In this way, powerful, 
positive groups are identified as advantaged; powerful, negative groups are defined as 
contenders; weak yet positively constructed groups, dependents and the weak and 
negative groups, deviants (Brucker, 2009). Using this approach, Brucker argues that 
persons with disabilities can be identified as dependents, whereas substance abusers 
are classified as deviants. Brucker‟s classification takes steps toward clarifying how and 
why the distinctions between substance addicts and people with disabilities exist. This 
can contribute to a greater understanding of the continued resistance to accept 
substance dependency as being on par with other disabilities. As well, it is useful in 
understanding how our perceptions of one another and our given situations may 
contribute to the extent to which we accept marginalized groups in society. However, 
the constructs of substance addiction as an individual pathology may also be impacted 
by the way in which society perceives and participates in the use of alcohol and drugs. 
 Room (2005) defines four characteristics of alcohol and drugs that contribute to 
the way in which society perceives their use. Firstly, Room characterizes them as 
“valued physical goods” (Room, 2005, p. 144), which renders them as a commodity 
subject to trade and use. Here we might envision the consumption of expensive 
champagne purchased to commemorate the first anniversary of a successful company 
or the ingestion of cocaine purchased from an unknown source to celebrate the 
beginning of a new year. Secondly, their use is “a social behaviour” (Room, 2005, 
p.144), and as such there is a natural tendency to have both social and cultural 
connections to alcohol and drugs. This social connection creates a “social meaning” 
(Room, 2005, p.144) of the substance, establishing its use as being one that goes 
beyond the physical effect that it has on the user(s). In this second characteristic, we 
might consider the connection of comradeship at the local pub for an after-work drink or 
the group occupation of a low-income dwelling in the more dangerous part of town that 
has been established as the area‟s crack house. Thirdly, Room discusses how 
psychoactive substance use is a “peculiarly intimate behaviour” (Room, 2005, p.144) in 
that it is a substance taken into the body, and like other products that are consumed, 
has the potential of enhancing or diminishing nutrition, maximizing, or compromising 
pleasure. In this third example we might imagine the depressed individual consuming 
prescription anti-depressants to monitor and control their moods or the depressed 
individual who monitors their moods and anxiety by starting and carrying on their day by 
consumption of alcoholic beverages. Fourthly, the act of consuming psychoactive 
substances is presumably done to impact feeling and thinking (Room, 2005) and 
therefore alters behaviour. In this final characteristic, we might consider the employee 
stepping out for a cigarette during their hectic work day or a heroin user injecting into 
her arm before she begins her hectic work day. 
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 The examples that are associated with each of Room‟s four characteristics of 
psychoactive substances are an attempt to demonstrate that there seem to be four 
distinct factors that impact society‟s perception and tolerance of substance addiction: its 
legal status, the level to which it is consumed, the frequency of use, and the context in 
which it is used. Contextualization of the recreational use of either drugs or alcohol 
within our own cultural and social experiences can distinguish the difference between 
recreational use and addiction. One‟s use of dependent substances as recreational, 
social, legal (or at least tolerated by the majority of society) tends to construe the 
conception that one‟s level of use is primarily gauged by self-control and discipline. 
Therefore, perception of our own ability to control the intake of addictive substances 
lends to a misperception that addiction is the result of a lack of self-discipline and a 
failure of personal will and strength.  
Whose Disability Counts and Whose Doesn’t 
 Secondly, by viewing substance addiction from the perspective of individual 
pathology, the ODSPA‟s explicit exclusion of substance addicts implies that substance 
dependency is not a legitimate disability. By doing so, it works to widen the gap not only 
between the non-disabled and disabled, but also between addicts and other people with 
disabilities. Distinctly defining what and what does not qualify as a disability under the 
ODSPA not only fails to include certain groups of persons, but also undermines the 
scope of Section 1 of the OHRC that maintains that “every person has a right to equal 
treatment with respect to services, goods...” (OHRC R.S.O.1990, c.H.19, s.1; 1999 C.6, 
s.28, 2001, c.32, s.27 (1); 2005, c.5, s.32 (1). Furthermore, as Jones and Basser Marks 
(1999) point out, “it is rare that a system is designed which really takes seriously the 
dignity of the person with a disability in (the) administrative process” (p. 369). This is 
clearly indicated by the Tribunal, which points out that in the context of 
Tranchemontagne’s case, the financial threshold of assets and income that qualified 
applicants for ODSP are allowed is greater than that allowed by the OW (Social Benefits 
Tribunal, p. 16). Therefore, for persons whose disability is addiction and whose assets 
and income meet the financial eligibility of the ODSPA but exceed that of the OWA, 
eligibility under both Acts is denied.  
 It stands that a clear delineation of what is and is not an acceptable disability has 
long been a pillar within social assistance programs like the ODSP and accepted as a 
legitimate necessity in protecting the integrity of social entitlement (Jones & Basser-
Marks, 1999). And yet, the ongoing presence of such narrowly defined, exclusionary 
guidelines means significant disadvantages for marginalized persons in Ontario who are 




The Tribunal finds that subsection 5(2) creates a distinction based on the personal 
characteristics, specifically the disability of the Appellants arising from their 
dependence on alcohol. The distinction imposes burdens and disadvantages on 
them that are not imposed on other disabled persons, withholding and limiting their 
access to income support and advantages available to other disabled persons. 




 The social constructions concerning alcoholism and drug abuse are, as Room 
(2005) states “heavily moralized territories often resulting in stigma and marginalization” 
(p. 143). For policy-makers, who choose to walk through such landscape, there ought to 
be a consideration of alternative approaches that work to diminish stigma. However, this 
often does not fare well on political agendas and election platforms, as political leaders 
and their policies may value stigma not as a restriction, but as a welcomed deterrent.  
 According to Room (2005) there are two literatures of stigma that are based on 
very different foundations. Firstly, there is the study of stigma associated with disability 
and illness, including mental illness that is focused on the value and necessity of 
neutralizing stigmas. This is evident in public policy initiatives that are designed with 
such intent in mind (Room, 2005). The second body of literature on stigma links it to 
crime. Here, stigma is considered a form of social control that can work as a common 
deterrent in upholding the seriousness of harsh imprisonment. If harsh imprisonment is 
applied too liberally, however, it can fail to maintain its influence in the management of 
undesirable behaviour (Room, 2005). The successful outcome of stigma as a form of 
social control relies on the notion that if no person is doing the stigmatized act then no 
person will be stigmatized. In this way, the deviant category as defined in Brucker‟s 
classification would fail to exist. But does the idealistic conception of stigma as a 
valuable control method of addiction justify the advancement of the marginalization of 
substance addicts in society? In other words, if it is recognized that subsection 5(2) of 
the ODSPA contributes to the substance dependency stigma, does the potential of the 
stigma as a deterrent towards illegal drug use justify the burdens and disadvantages 
that are placed on substance addicts? In an attempt to answer this, we will briefly 
consider the United States Social Assistance Program as an example of a social policy 
approach that specifically excluded substance addiction from its eligibility criterion.  
Bill 104-121 
 In 1996, the United States Congress passed Bill 104-121 that altered the 
eligibility criteria in two American public assistance programs: Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI) and Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) (Roan Gresenz, Watkins, & 
Podus, 1998). While similar in their purposes, the original intent of the DI program was 
to replace lost income in families when the primary wage earner became disabled, 
whereas the SSI was designed to subsidize low levels of income earned by the 
disabled, blind, and elderly (Roan Gresenz et al., 1998). Within the SSI was a focused 
program, established in 1974, specifically for drug addiction and alcoholism. In the 
beginning, the population of this small, federally funded program was primarily made up 
of aging alcoholics who tended, more often than not, to suffer from alcohol-related 
impairments such as cirrhosis of the liver (Swartz, Baumohl, & Lurigio, 2004). However, 
toward the end of the program‟s existence in the mid-1990s, almost 50% of the program 
participants were identified as illegal drug users. The negative profile of such statistics 
projected onto the American public the sensational portrayal of a social program that 
was “a wasteful entitlement that facilitated addiction by disbursing monthly checks to 
drug addicts” (Swartz et al., 2004, p. 97). The passing of the bill in 1996 idealized the 
theory that a loss of primary income would prompt substance abusers to return to work. 
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However, the likelihood of such outcomes was minimal given the extent of substance 
abuse and its related health problems (Roan Gresenz et al., 1998).  
 As argued above with direct reference to the OWA, such expectations only serve 
to emphasize substance addiction as an individual pathology, in which the individual is 
at fault for his or her moral failings. As such, the state interprets its responsibility toward 
substance addicts as one that is premised in fixing the problem of addiction by denying 
access to services that exist to uphold basic human rights such as equality and the right 
to health.  
 Although minimal and limited alternative support for substance addicts exists in 
the form of state general assistance (Roan Gresenz et al., 1998), the reality of the 
exclusionary criterion lies not only on the impact that Bill 104-121 has had on substance 
addicts, but in the projection that many scholars have since made about the effect it 
would have on the American public. For example, along with a failure to integrate into 
the work force, Roan Gresenz et al. (1998) forecasted that the loss of monthly social 
assistance for substance abusers would generate an increased need for community 
programs that provide for the homeless such as shelters and soup kitchens. Linked to 
this same state of desperation and destitution is the potential for increased crime and 
homelessness. Furthermore, as Room (2005) indicates, the use of psychoactive 
substances not only results in health and social concerns for the user, it also has 
consequences of “injury and other harm to others and problems in work and family 
roles” (Room, 2005, p.146). Additionally, the extensive and complex social and health 
care systems that are put into place to handle health problems related to substance 
abuse can be significantly burdened when income support for addicts is decreased 
(Room, 2005; Roan Gresenz et al., 1998; Swartz et al., 2004). As Erickson and 
Callaghan (2005) have argued and as stated elsewhere in this paper, this is a reflection 
of the government‟s failure to recognize the social and economic impact that denying 
addicts social assistance can have on communities and other persons.   
 Subsection 5 (2), par. (c) of the ODSPA states that a person is not eligible for 
income support if the “only substantial restriction in activities of daily living is attributable 
to the use or cessation of use of the alcohol, drug or other substance at the time of 
determining or reviewing eligibility” (ODSPA, 1997). Similarly, in the United States, the 
SSI outlined the criteria used to determine whether or not drug addiction or alcoholism 
“is a contributing factor material to the determination of disability” (Supplemental 
Security Income Act, Section 416.935, 1995, emphasis added). By recognizing 
alcoholism and drug addiction as contributing factors to a disability, both Acts have 
found a way to provide accommodation in a limited manner that recognizes substance 
addiction without fully acknowledging that, in and of itself, addiction is a disability. Under 
both Acts a person who is physically disabled and an alcoholic, or an individual that is 
intellectually impaired as well as being a drug addict qualifies for income support. But 
the alcoholic and the drug addict without other disabilities do not. As another case in 
point, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which was intended as a “broad, 
national civil rights-oriented mandate for the elimination of discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities” (Westreich, 2002, p.355 citing American with Disabilities 
Act, Section 2: 1990), states in Section 12114, that “a qualified individual with a 
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disability shall not include any employee or applicant who is currently engaging in the 
illegal use of drugs” (ADA, 1990, Section 12114, par. [a]). 
 These excerpts from Canadian and American legislations that are so very 
influential in the lives of addicts demonstrate how selective and conditional recognition 
of substance addiction within the context of other disabilities creates differential 
treatment among persons with disabilities. Westreich (2002) argues that this dichotomy 
reflects the challenge that exists for governments and society in “finding an acceptable 
definition of addiction that recognizes it as a physical and psychiatric illness without 
denying an element of personal responsibility with regard to substance abuse” (p. 355). 
There is a great deal to suggest that the legislation is basing its eligibility criterion not on 
those who are disadvantaged because of a disability, but on how disabilities were 
created and whether or not the cause of disability is socially acceptable. 
 In Tranchemontagne, the Social Benefits Tribunal states that, “it appears...that 
the legislature has differentiated between the Appellants group and other persons with 
the same disability as the Appellants, on the basis of how the disability rose” (Social 
Benefits Tribunal, p.17). When legislation is based upon how disabilities arise, it fails to 
guide society toward a greater concept of inclusivity. Admittedly, there is a challenge for 
governments and society to find a definition of addiction that strikes a balance between 
recognizing it as a disability and maintaining a level of personal responsibility for 
addicts. But perhaps striving to find a definitive version of what disability is and is not 
and then attempting to plug addiction into it should not be the primary objective, 
because when legislation addresses addicts from the base of how the disability was 
created, there seems to be little opportunity to focus on what addiction is. Instead, by 
moving away from how a disability was created, legislation becomes a force in 
educating society on why addiction is a disability. If policies go beyond how a disability 
was created, in particular as it pertains to substance addiction, there is opportunity to 
realize equal rights within social assistance programs. And by educating society on 
addiction and disability and creating awareness of the similar constructions that 




...a positive intention cannot save the regulation... the legislature‟s intention is 
much less important than the real effects of the scheme on the claimants...Groups 
that are subject to an inferior differential treatment based on an enumerated or 
analogous ground are not treated with dignity just because the government claims 
that the differential provisions are for their own good. (Social Benefits Tribunal, 
p.18) 
 
 By creating policy that recognizes the disabling effects of addiction, there is 
greater opportunity to create a deeper understanding of the variances that exist within 
society, to promote tolerance, and to diminish stigmas that obstruct those who seek to 
better their positions and themselves. Failing to include addicts as persons with 
disabilities might initially be viewed as the most progressive step toward ameliorating 
addiction and its rippling effects felt throughout the community. It might also be viewed 
14 
 
as a key factor in maintaining low-cost and even reducing a potentially significant strain 
on social welfare programs whose services ought to be reserved for those who deserve 
the support and whose disability is not self-inflicted. Additionally, proponents of keeping 
addicts on the outside of the inclusion framework might also consider it to be the most 
effective way to protect disability from negative social views that could hinder the 
progress made within the disabled community. It can be argued that when one type of 
substance addiction is established as a disability qualifying the individual for social 
assistance benefits, all substance addictions must also be given equal consideration 
and granted similar outcome. And within societies that struggle with the ongoing 
presence of addiction, the resentment that these outcomes would generate seems 
justified. However, while there are lessons to be learned from the Social Benefits 
Tribunal‟s ruling of Tranchemontagne v. Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program), 
there are also four key lessons to draw from the fact that the case had legs and moved 
up the provincial justice system.  
 Firstly, the case itself is not only important to addicts and persons with 
disabilities. It is important to non-substance abusers and the non-disabled too because 
the realization of the rights of all persons who identify with a disability strengthens the 
rights of all (Senator Harkin, 136 Congressional Rec. S9684-03 as cited in Westreich, 
2002, p. 357). 
 Secondly, by provoking a reconsideration of what society believed to be a clearly 
defined perimeter surrounding the issues of addiction, disability, and entitlement 
programs, the Tribunal has unleashed a debate on whether or not substance abuse 
ought to qualify as a disability. And what is important to realize is that the debate has 
begun and is indeed in progress. If the Tribunal had ruled against the Appellants, in all 
likelihood substance addicts, alcoholics, and subsection 5(2) of the ODSPA would be 
pushed far out of the public eye with very few persons being aware of the exclusionary 
clauses that are part of our social benefit programs. 
 Thirdly and equally important is that the case has inspired questions that have 
widened the scope of society‟s perception of addictions. In essence, the Tribunal‟s 
decision asks of the public, “what is a disability?” and such questions, in a proper forum, 
are explored and bring about a greater understanding of the complexities that surround 
people with disabilities. 
 Finally, the process of the Tranchemontagne case through the Ontario court 
systems and the Tribunal‟s decision is a solid example of the growing recognition by 
legislators that society‟s perception of substance abuse is influenced by the social 
policies that are in place. Indeed, perhaps the greatest lesson to be learned from this 
case is that by deciding to include alcoholism and other substance addiction as 
disabilities qualifying for income support in Ontario, the Tribunal and the legislation it 
presides over recognize the vital role they play in enhancing or diminishing inclusivity 
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